In order to control the growth of human population it is helpful to understand correctly the mechanism of growth, and the first essential step is to investigate current interpretations and reject any unscientific explanations. One of such popular but questionable interpretations is the concept of the Epoch of Malthusian Stagnation. We discuss its origin, narrative and claims. We explain why this concept is scientifically unacceptable. This investigation questions also the closely-related Demographic Transition Theory, whose essential component is the assumed mechanism of Malthusian stagnation for the first stage of growth.
Introduction 2
Seven groups of trends are now shaping the future of our planet (Nielsen, 2005 (Nielsen, , 2006 (Nielsen, , 2007 .
One of them, and the prime mover of the remaining six, is the excessive growth of human 1 r.nielsen@griffith.edu.au; ronwnielsen@gmail.com; http://home.iprimus.com.au/nielsens/ronnielsen.html Suggested citation: Nielsen, R. W. aka Nurzynski, J. (2013) . Scientifically unacceptable concept of the Epoch of Malthusian Stagnation. http://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1310/1310.4258.pdf explain why the apparent natural tendency of the growth of population is to follow hyperbolic trajectory (Shklovskii, 1962 (Shklovskii, , 2002 von Foerster & Amiot, 1960; von Hoerner, 1975) , the amazingly simple pathway, suggesting that the assumption of the Malthusian stagnation mechanism is irrelevant and inapplicable
It is interesting that Malthus used arithmetic and geometric progressions to support his arguments but it is not certain whether he was familiar with the hyperbolic growth, let alone that he appreciated the difference between the hyperbolic and exponential (geometrical) types of growth. Even now many people do not know the difference, and as discussed in another place (Nielsen, 2013a (Nielsen, , 2013b (Nielsen, , 2013c they fall into the trap of the hyperbolic illusion, the deception persuading them to accept the concept of the Epoch of Malthusian Stagnation and the associated concept of the escape from the mythical Malthusian trap or a similar concept of a sudden intensification in the growth of human population (Johnson & Brook, 2011) .
The stagnation
One would expect that in the course of time, the explanations and ideas put forward by
Malthus would have been checked by data and if necessarily corrected, but in over 200 years, little progress, if any, has been made in this field, and whatever progress has been made, such as in showing that the growth of human population is not exponential but hyperbolic and remarkably stable (Shklovskii, 1962 (Shklovskii, , 2002 von Foerster & Amiot, 1960; von Hoerner, 1975) , has been generally ignored. The original ideas of Malthus about the effects of positive checks have been adorned by many colourful and attractive descriptions until they evolved into a powerful and compelling narrative. If there is any form of stagnation, it is the stagnation in the understanding of the human population dynamics.
The history of population theory can be summarized in three words: pre-Malthusian, Malthusian, and post-Malthusian. Hardly ever in intellectual history does one man so dominate a field as does the Reverend Thomas Robert Malthus in demographic theory.
To paraphrase a quotation attributed to Newton, Malthus' shoulders must be climbed (Thomlinson, 1965, p. 47 . Italics in the original text.).
…the demographic transition experiences three regimes: the 'Malthusian Regime,' the 'Post-Malthusian Regime,' and the 'Modern Growth Regime.' Any theory attempts (sic) to describe the process of demographic transition must include these three periods (Wang, 2005, p. 3. Italics added.).
Claiming, suggesting or assuming that something must be accepted just because it comes from a certain source is not acceptable in science. Any theory can be questioned and even should be questioned, and if necessarily corrected or rejected. The sooner it is done the better.
If Malthus's shoulders must be climbed it is only for the same reason as climbing the shoulders of any giants of human intellect: to see better and further ahead.
The myth
According to the concept of the Epoch of Malthusian Stagnation, human population was locked in the Malthusian Trap of positive checks for many thousands of years, the trap controlling and suppressing growth, the process reflected in fluctuations or random oscillations in the size of human population (Galor 2005 (Galor , 2007 Galor & Moav, 2001; Galor & Weil 1999 , 2000 Manfredi & Fanti, 2003) . The growth was slow, if any, chaotic and unpredictable. This narrative reflects closely the descriptions of the first stage of growth claimed by the Demographic Transition Theory (Caldwell, 1976 (Caldwell, , 2006 Casterline, 2003; Coale, 1973; Haupt & Kane, 2005; Kirk, 1996; Landry, 1934; Lee, 2003; Lehr, 2009; Notestein, 1945; Olshansky & Ault, 1986; Olshansky, Carnes, Rogers, & Smith, 1997 , 1998 Omran, 1971 Omran, , 1983 Omran, , 1998 Omran, , 2005 Rogers & Hackenberg, 1987; Singha & Zacharia, 1984; Thompson, 1929; van de Kaa, 2008; Warf, 2010) .
While the origin of the concept of stagnation can be traced back to Malthus and linked with the well-known Demographic Transition Theory, the term "epoch of Malthusian stagnation" was probably first introduced by Galor and Moav (2001) and strongly reinforced by Galor in his so-called Unified Growth Theory (Galor, 2004 (Galor, , 2005 , the theory producing no verifiable distributions and not a single fit to the data. Indeed, in the detailed discussion of this theory (Galor, 2005) , the discussion containing over one hundred pages of closely-spaced print, many complicated formulae, calculations and graphs are presented but not a single graph comparing theoretical predictions with the relevant data (Maddison, 2001) , the data referred to in this document but not used for a direct verification of the discussed theory.
A broader concept attempting to explain the growth of human population is the idea of the existence of three regimes of growth: (1) Malthusian Regime (or Malthusian Epoch),
Post-Malthusian Regime and (3) Sustained (or Modern) Growth Regime (Galor & Weil, 1999 , 2000 Galor, 2005) , the idea contradicted by the close analysis of data (Maddison, 2001 ) known to Galor (2005) . This proposed sequence of growth and the sequence claimed by the Demographic Transition Theory, containing four stages of growth but maybe even five (Haupt & Kane, 2005; Olshansky, Carnes, Rogers, & Smith, 1998; Schmid, 1984; van de Kaa, 2008) , or six stages (Myrskyla, Kohler & Billari, 2009) , is too untidy and unappealing.
Each stage of growth is governed by different sets of forces. (Routinely more than one force is assumed for each stage.) In addition, certain specific forces have to be assumed for each transition between relevant stages, all this creating a complex explanation of growth, while the data (Maddison, 2010; Manning, 2008; US Census Bureau, 2013) and their limited analysis (Shklovskii, 1962 (Shklovskii, , 2002 von Foerster & Amiot, 1960; von Hoerner, 1975 ) suggest a simpler mechanism and a better explanation.
Rather than moving forward we seem to be moving in circles. Rather than looking for an alternative and possibly simpler and more suitable interpretation of the growth of human population suggested both by the data and by their limited analysis, the interpretation unknown to Malthus, because his work was based on strongly limited information, we seem to be trapped by focusing strongly on just one mechanism of growth he has considered, the mechanism of stagnation that probably never worked. What is probably simple is made complicated and untidy.
The problem with the explanation of the human population dynamics reminds about the problem encountered many years ago with the explanation of the dynamics of celestial bodies. Describing the work of mathematicians of his time, Osiander wrote:
With them it is as though an artist were to gather the hands, feet, head and other members from his images from divers models, each part excellently drawn, but not related to a single body, and since they in no way match each other, the result would be monster rather than man (Copernicus, 1995) .
Population which constantly operated behind the seemingly random variations in fertility and mortality induced by epidemic, famine, and war (Lee, 1997 (Lee, , p. 1063 .
Claims:
1. Population size was determined by the demand for labour 2. This is the Law of Growth 3. This law has been accepted by Classical and early Neo-Classical economists 4. There were seemingly random variations in fertility and mortality 5. Random variations were caused by epidemics, famine and war 6. This law operated constantly behind these seemingly random variations.
It is interesting how much is claimed in this single paragraph and it does not matter whether
Lee agrees with all these claims or just describes them. This quotation represents a typical set of questionable claims often encountered in publications related to the concept of the Epoch of Malthusian Stagnation. Can we prove them or do we have to take them by faith?
To prove this "Law of Population" we would have to have data about the demand for labour and about the growth of population extending over thousands of years, and we would have to prove that there is a correlation between the demand for labour and the size of human population, or the birth rates. We cannot prove it because we do not have such data, but we can show that the population data (Maddison, 2010; Manning, 2008; US Census Bureau, 2013) do not display any features that could linked with this "Law of Population." Was human procreation really guided so rationally by the demand for labour or was it prompted by more basic and primordial force? There is nothing in the population data to support this "Law of Population" and nothing to support the claims of "Classical economist, and early Neo-Classical economists as well."
It is easy to accept, without a proof, that there were random variations in the fertility and mortality. It would be probably more difficult to expect that there were no variations but we have no information about the amplitude of these variations because while we have reliable data about the size of human population (Maddison, 2010; Manning, 2008; US Census Bureau, 2013 ) over thousands of years we have no matching data about fertility and mortality (birth rates and death rates).
How can we ever claim that these assumed and imagined random variations were "induced by epidemic, famine, and war"? How can we feel safe in taking such a leap of faith? How can we expect that such leaps of faith will lead us in the right direction? The only outcome we can expect is that they will lead us gradually further away from finding correct answers.
It should be also noted that the growth of population is not determined by the absolute values of birth and death rates but by the difference between these two quantities. This difference determines the growth rate. A constant difference (growth rate) produces exponential growth.
A zero difference produces constant population. However, variable difference (growth rate)
does not necessarily produce a variable size of the population and we shall investigate this issue further in the next publication. Even if the birth and death rates were high and fluctuating we cannot automatically claim that they were producing random fluctuations and stagnation in the size of human population. Here we have a vivid description of what was happening so long ago and over a long time, not only a vivid description but also an explanation, as if we moved back in time and saw it all happening in front of our eyes. However, this account is in direct contradiction with the data describing the growth of human population (Maddison, 2010; Manning, 2008 ; US Census Bureau, 2013) because there were never "long periods of time" when there was "almost no population growth at all." It can be easily checked using the data that the growth of population, global, regional and even local, was in general following remarkably stable trajectories.
It is both amazing and disturbing that these hypothetical chaotic changes in the growth of human population are not only so confidently claimed but also so categorically explained by correlating them with "periodic epidemics of plague, cholera, typhoid and other infectious diseases." It would be hard, or impossible, to demonstrate these correlations: hard because one would have to analyse records of all demographic catastrophes and try to isolate the impacts caused by "periodic epidemics of plague, cholera, typhoid and other infectious diseases;" hard or impossible because it is generally hard or impossible to isolate specific causes of death; impossible because population data (Maddison, 2010; Manning, 2008 ; US Census Bureau, 2013) do not show any signs of periodic crashes and recoveries in the growth of population. It is impossible to correlated the non-existent features with "periodic epidemics of plague, cholera, typhoid and other infectious diseases." Typically for such confident claims, if they are not closely scrutinised they might sound attractive and convincing, but they have to be accepted by faith.
We seem to know also so much about the birth and deaths rates, how high they were and how they were fluctuating for thousands of years but all these descriptions, pronounced with confidence, are based on speculations and conjuncture because we simply do not have the relevant data to support these claims. We may consider ourselves fortunate to have fairly reliable estimates of the size of human population in the distant past (Maddison, 2010; Manning, 2008 ; US Census Bureau, 2013) but we have no matching data for the birth and death rates. The data for the size of human population do not support the concept of stagnation.
We might feel or think that our descriptions are true; we might wish that they were true, but we should test them by empirical evidence. Furthermore, even if we assume that birth and death rates were high and strongly fluctuating we cannot automatically claim that such fluctuations are reflected in the size of human population. We might feel that they are but we would have to prove it. All these speculations about the death and birth rates being high, closely balanced and producing stagnant state of growth are not based on solid scientific evidence and on the accepted process of scientific investigation but on leaps of faith reinforced by creative imagination.
We also seem to have so much information about the harsh living conditions in the distant past and about their suppressive influence on the growth of human population but we are ignoring the contradictory evidence in the third-world countries. If we spent more time on investigating empirical evidence rather than on creative writing maybe we could learn something useful about human population dynamics.
…the food-controlled homeostatic equilibrium had prevailed since time immemorial" (Komlos, 2000, p. 320 ).
…the population tends to oscillate in a homeostatic mechanism resulting from the conflict between the population's natural tendency to increase and the limitations imposed by the availability of food (Artzrouni & Komlos, 1985, p. 24) .
1. There was a food-controlled homeostatic equilibrium 2. This equilibrium prevailed since time immemorial 3. Population tends to oscillate in a homeostatic mechanism 4. Oscillations are caused by the natural tendency of the population to increase and by the limitations imposed by the availability of food
There is nothing to stop anyone from assuming homeostatic mechanism for the growth of human population but to claim that "homeostatic equilibrium had prevailed since time immemorial" we would have to work a little harder. We would have to design a model with the homeostatic equilibrium and show that it fits the relevant data "since time immemorial," but even then we would have to allow for the possibility that some other mechanism could also fit the data equally well or maybe even better. Life would be too easy if we could just imagine that something happened and claim that it did happen. We have no convincing evidence that there was homeostatic equilibrium between the supply of food and the size of human population let alone that "food-controlled homeostatic equilibrium had prevailed since time immemorial." Artzrouni and Komlos (1985) claim that "the population tends to oscillate in a homeostatic mechanism." Such oscillations add an extra degree of difficulty in reconciling the theory with the data. The oscillations should be produced by the model but even more importantly they should be also demonstrated in the relevant data.
Population data (Maddison, 2010; Manning, 2008; US Census Bureau, 2013) show no signs of such oscillations. Furthermore, if we examine closely the results of the calculations based on this "homeostatic mechanism" we shall see that Artzrouni and Komlos (1985) generated a steadily-increasing exponential growth with no signs of any oscillations and that their calculated distribution does not fit the population data.
The absence of the desired oscillations or stagnation and the disagreement with the data show that the assumed mechanism of Malthusian stagnation does not work. The claim that "the population tends to oscillate in a homeostatic mechanism" is neither confirmed by the data nor by the model, which assumes the presence of such oscillations. Birth and death rates may have been high and strongly fluctuating but it does not matter.
High and fluctuating birth and death rates do not necessarily prove the existence of a stagnant state of growth because, as mentioned earlier, growth is determined by the average difference between these two quantities. (We shall examine this issue more closely in the next publication.) Even more importantly, studying just the death rates or birth rates, or equivalently studying just the fertility rates (Lehr, 2009 ) cannot be used as the evidence of stagnation or of the demographic transitions because if for instant the average fertility rates decrease in the same way as the average mortality rates, if the gap between them is approximately constant or gradually increasing, they will not produce any form of transition in the growth of population or any form of stagnation but rather a steady and undisturbed growth.
To generate a stagnant state we would have to have fertility and mortality rates changing in a very special way. The average difference between them could not be constant or increasing but it should be zero. While we cannot investigate the long-range time-dependence of the birth and death rates because we do not have the relevant data, we can study the timedependence of the size of the population and these data do not confirm the existence of any form of stagnation, let alone stagnation that lasted for thousands of years.
It is well documented that the fluctuations experienced by the world's population throughout history did not have a regular, cyclical pattern, but were, to a large extent, brought about by randomly determined demographic crises (wars, famines, epidemics, etc.). As McKeown and others have pointed out, the main cause of these fluctuations of the past were mortality crises. There are four kinds of crises: subsistence crises, epidemic crises, combined crises (subsistence/epidemic), and finally crises from other causes, which are mainly exogenous (wars, natural or other catastrophes)
Crises followed by periods of population decline during which the nutritional status of the population improved gave rise to fluctuations which testify to the continued existence of the 'Malthusian trap': population would not grow beyond its carrying capacity for long, and when it did, the resulting overshoot was followed by a 'crash' (i.e. the positive checks such as diseases, famines, wars, etc.) (Artzrouni & Komlos 1985, p. 24 . Italics added.).
1. There were fluctuations in the world's population throughout history 2. These fluctuations are well documented 3. It is well documented that these fluctuations did not have a cyclic pattern 4. It is well documented that these fluctuations were, to a large extent, brought about by randomly determined demographic crises (wars, famines, epidemics, etc.)
5. The main cause of these fluctuations were mortality crises 6. There are four types of crises 7. Crises were followed by periods of population decline 8. Population decline improved nutritional status 9. Fluctuations testify to the continuing existence of Malthusian trap 10. Population was repeatedly reaching its carrying capacity 11. Population would not grow beyond its carrying capacity for long 12. Population growing beyond its carrying capacity was reflected in overshoots 13. Overshoots were followed by crashes.
If it is so well-documented it would be interesting to see at least a few references to this important and fundamental research work, to see the data for these fluctuations "throughout history," to see a positive proof that the "the fluctuations experienced by the world's population throughout history" are correlated with "demographic crises (wars, famines, epidemics, etc.)," that they were "brought about by randomly determined demographic crises." It would be also interesting to see convincing evidence that population was reaching its carrying capacity, that "population would not grow beyond its carrying capacity for long," the convincing evidence of overshoots and crashes, evidence that crashes were associated with "positive checks such as diseases, famines, wars, etc.," the compelling evidence of the existence of Malthusian trap, the demonstration of "periods of population decline," the compelling proof that periods of population decline caused by demographic crises were improving nutritional status.
It is well documented (Maddison, 2010; Manning, 2008; US Census Bureau, 2013 ) that the growth of human population does not show fluctuations or random behaviour. It is well documented that the data show no signs of frequent overshoots and crashes, no signs of growth reaching its carrying capacity, no signs of the "continued existence of the 'Malthusian trap'," no evidence that the "population would not grow beyond its carrying capacity for long," and no "periods of population decline." All these colourful and dramatic descriptions associated with the narrative of the mythical Epoch of Malthusian Stagnation are not confirmed by the population data.
It is obvious, that demographic crises were often causing decline in the size of local populations, depending on their scale and depending on what we understand by a local crisis.
Sometimes it might have been just a large death toll in a city, a part of a country, as for instance in China (Mallory, 1926) , or maybe in the whole country or even extending over a few countries. However, a large death toll does not necessarily mean a significant impact on the growth of human population. A large death toll should not be immediately interpreted as a population decline; it could have been just a slower growth over a certain time. All these issues should be closely investigated by examining records of demographic catastrophes. To arrive at any reasonably supported conclusion we would have to do some work. However, we have no data showing that these local demographic crises were repeatedly causing fluctuations in the growth of regional or global populations. In fact, the data show remarkably stable growth of human population, unaffected by demographic crises.
The opening statement in the above quotation contains two interesting and characteristic elements, the elements occurring repeatedly in the descriptions of the concept of the Epoch of Malthusian Stagnation: (1) it makes a highly-questionable but confident declaration about the existence of certain features (in this case about the existence of fluctuations) and (2) it equally confidently explains them while ignoring empirical evidence. The normal progression is first to observe certain features and then try to explain them. We can also reverse the process: we can first predict the existence of certain features. However, to accept the prediction and the associated explanation, we would have to demonstrate the existence of the predicted features.
So in this case, we would have to show first that there were significant fluctuations in the birth and death rates or in the size of human population and then we would also have to explain them convincingly by demonstrating that they were correlated with demographic crises. Alternatively, we would have to predict (using a suitable mathematical model) fluctuations in birth and death rates or in the size of human population by assuming that they are correlated with demographic crises and then we would have to show that our prediction is confirmed by the relevant data.
We cannot prove that there were fluctuations "throughout history" in the birth and death rates because we do not have the relevant data, but we can prove that there were no fluctuations "throughout history" in the size of human population because we have the relevant data (Maddison, 2010; Manning, 2008; US Census Bureau, 2013) . There is nothing here to explain, except perhaps to explain the absence of fluctuations, the absence of random behaviour, crashes, overshoots or "periods of population decline."
Referring to three sources (Habakkuk, 1953; Kunitz, 1983; McKeown, 1983 (Komlos, 1989, pp. 194, 195 . Italics added.).
1. There was a long-term equilibrium between population size and the food supply 2. This equilibrium was maintained by positive checks (mortality crises) 3. Crises were followed by periods when human nutritional status was above the level of subsistence 4. This process gave rise to cycles 5. The cycles testify to the continued existence of the 'Malthusian population trap' 6. Population could not grow beyond an upper bound imposed by the resource and capital constraints of the economic structure in which it was imbedded 7. Malthusian trap was active for millennia 8. The escape for the Malthusian trap occurred when the aggregate capital stock was large enough and grew fast enough to provide additional sustenance for the population Massive amount of work would be required to support all these impressive declarations. We would have to study food supply over millennia and determine how they were correlated with the growth of human population. We would have to prove that there was "a long-run equilibrium between population size and the food supply." We would have to study mortality crises over millennia. We would have to establish a correlation between the growth of human population, food supply and mortality crises. We would also have to investigate upper bounds of "resource and capital constraints" and prove that over millennia the size of the population was repeatedly reaching the limits of these upper bounds. It is easy to declare so much so quickly and with such a confidence, but it is harder to prove it. It is also hard to accept it, but accept we must if we want to accept the concept of the Epoch of Malthusian Stagnation.
The cycles cannot possibly testify to "the continued existence of the 'Malthusian population trap'" because they did not exist. Judging from the context, the reference here is to the cycles in the size of human population. There are no signs of cycles in the population data (Maddison, 2010; Manning, 2008; US Census Bureau, 2013) . The absence of cycles and the steady growth of human population testify that the Malthusian trap did not exist. We cannot also claim that there was "'escape' from this trap" because there was no trap.
If the cycles refer to the mortality rates, it is even worse because we do not have the relevant data extending over millennia to claim that they "testify to the continued existence of the 'Malthusian population trap'."
Discussing the first stage of the Demographic Transition Theory, Warf explains:
Because both fertility and mortality rates are high, the difference between themnatural population growth -is relatively low, fluctuating around zero" (Warf, 2010, p. 708. Italics added.).
1. During the first stage of the demographic transition fertility and mortality rates were high.
2. Natural population growth (growth rate) was fluctuating around zero
In this quotation the "natural population growth" is identified as the difference between the fertility and mortality rates, i.e. as the growth rate. We shall recall that while the growth rate fluctuating around a constant value describes exponential growth, the growth rate "fluctuating around zero' describes the constant size of the growing entity, that is in our case, the constant size of the population. The claim made by Warf is contradicted by data, which show that for thousands of years the size of human population was increasing. The "natural population growth" (growth rate) could not have been "fluctuating around zero." Furthermore, two timedependent quantities do not have to be large to make the difference between them small and fluctuating around zero, so the cause-effect relation is also incorrectly identified.
In line with the accepted interpretations of the first stage of the Demographic Transition,
Lagerlöf writes:
The Malthusian Regime in our model is a stable situation where death and birth rates are both high, and population roughly constant. Moreover, mortality is highly volatile, increasing dramatically in periods of big epidemic shocks. In periods with mild shocks population expands. This worsens the impact of the next epidemic, equilibrating population back to its Malthusian state (Lagerlöf, 2003a, p. 756 . Italics added).
In our model, the world can thus be stuck in a Malthusian equilibrium for centuries and then suddenly escape, and never contract back. As suggested by a referee, this process could possibly be interpreted in terms of wars, instead of epidemics (Lagerlöf, 2003a, p. 766. Italics added.).
Throughout human history, epidemics, wars and famines have shaped the growth path
of population. Such shocks to mortality are the central theme of the model set up by Lagerlöf, which endogenously generates a long phase of stagnant population and living standards, followed by an industrial revolution and a demographic transition (Lagerlöf, 2003b, pp. 434, 435 . Italics added.).
1. It is assumed that there was a Malthusian regime 2. It is assumed that Malthusian regime is characterised by high birth and death Stagnation and that they fail to fit the relevant population data.
It appears that Lagerlöf interpreted the roughly constant growth rate as the roughly constant population. When we look at the results of his Monte Carlo calculations (Lagerlöf, 2003b, p. 436) carried out using the model described in his companion publication (Lagerlöf, 2003a) we can see that he displays roughly constant growth rates generated by his model but interprets them as population growth.
As already mentioned earlier, roughly constant growth rates produce exponential growth.
They do not produce roughly constant population. Thus, rather than showing that the population was roughly constant, fluctuating and stagnant, Lagerlöf has shown that his model generated exponential growth of population, which is definitely not stagnant. Paradoxically, therefore, Lagerlöf has shown that if we assume that the growth of population is controlled by random forces, we shall not produce a stagnant state with a roughly constant size of the population but a steady, non-stagnant, exponential growth. It is interesting that under similar conditions but using a different approach for their computer simulations, Artzrouni and Komlos (1985) also did not generate stagnation but a steady exponential growth of human population.
Lagerlöf as well as Artzrouni and Komlos were on the verge of making a breakthrough discovery. Had they carried out their research properly, had they adhered to the principles of impartial and unbiased scientific investigation, they would have discovered that the assumption of the existence of Malthusian oscillations resulted in producing a steadily increasing size of human population without any signs of oscillations or fluctuations. They would have discovered that their models strongly question the whole concept of Malthusian stagnation and that perhaps all these positive checks proposed by Malthus do not have such a profound effect on the growth of human population as feared by him and as accepted by so many people who do not seem to question his original suggestions and expectations.
However, results of Lagerlöf as well as of Artzrouni and Komlos also show that while producing exponential growth, as expected by Malthus, the generated distributions do not fit the data. This is another interesting and important clue. Perhaps Malthus was not correct in assuming that the population if unchecked increases exponentially. Perhaps he would have suggested something different if he had access to all the data so easily available to us.
Perhaps we do not have to accept blindly and reverently all his concepts. Perhaps they are not immune to the process of scientific investigation; particularly that Malthus never expected or wanted to have such an unassailable immunity for his concepts.
It is hard to understand why Lagerlöf did not compare results of his model calculations with the data describing the growth of human population because he had access to the relevant data (Maddison, 2001) . It was such an essential and important step to take but for whatever reason it was not taken.
In our model, this leads to a constant rate of population growth prior to the adoption of the Solow technology. This result is consistent with population data from Michael
Kremer ( Second, we would have to show convincingly that the growth rate was indeed fluctuating around a small constant value. Kremer (1963) did not carry out an extensive study of the growth rate but his limited investigation shows that it was not constant and that it was not fluctuating, but that it was increasing approximately linearly with the size of the population.
Hansen and Prescott must have seen these results because Kremer presents them in a graph, which is impossible to miss, and yet for some unexplained reason they did not use them.
The regularity noticed by Kremer is in perfect agreement with the evidence of the hyperbolic growth (Shklovskii, 1962 (Shklovskii, , 2002 von Foerster & Amiot, 1960; von Hoerner, 1975) . This combined evidence deserves further investigation but it strongly suggests that the growth rate was probably never fluctuating around a constant value.
It might not be immediately obvious but this short declaration that "the growth rate of population fluctuates around a small constant throughout most of the Malthusian period"
contains a huge amount of questionable information. We would have to do a lot of hard work to be able to say so much, so categorically and with such a confidence.
We would have to prove convincingly that the Malthusian period existed. Such a proof, on its own, would have been a monumental achievement deserving a special recognition. We would then have to study the behaviour of the growth rate during that period, preferably going back to the dawn of our existence some 200,000 or 300,000 years ago and show convincingly that sometimes the growth rate was not fluctuating around a constant value but most of the time it did.
Such leaps of faith, such confident but strongly questionable declarations, such claims containing so much unproven assertions occur repeatedly in the descriptions of the concept of the Epoch of Malthusian Stagnation. When accepted by faith, they can be easily reinforced by other dubious concepts, one wrong step followed by another, leading to an increasing accumulation of incorrect ideas, to the development of a system based on misconceptions, to the narratives, which might be interesting and fascinating but leading away from discovering correct interpretations.
If population density increases the mortality rate rises, equilibrating population back to the Malthusian trap (Lagerlöf, 2003a, p. 765 . Italics added.).
Here we have an example of an interesting detail in the concept of the Epoch of Malthusian Stagnation, the detail containing huge amount of information. This statement introduces the concept of the dependence of mortality rates on the density of human population. It offers an explanation of the mechanism of the Malthusian trap, whose existence is not supported by the population data. It describes some kind of a general rule stating that the Malthusian trap is activated when the population density, not its size, reaches a certain limiting value.
There is no research confirming the described mechanism; no research showing how the growth of human population depends on its density. Even if we could show some isolated examples of density-dependent growth we would have to demonstrate that they apply to Other terms used to describe the alleged stagnant and fluctuating state of growth during this mythical Epoch of Malthusian Stagnation are "equilibrium trap" or "population trap" (Leibenstein, 1957; Nelson, 1956) , "multiple equilibria" or "poverty trap" (Wang, 2005) .
The belief in the stagnant and fluctuating growth is so strong that mathematical models are deemed successful if they can generate the desired oscillations during this mythical Epoch of Malthusian Stagnation, and no-one seems to care about taking the next and the most essential step to compare model calculations with the population data (Galor, 2005; Galor & Weil, 2000; Lagerlöf, 2003a Lagerlöf, , 2003b . As long as oscillations of some kind are generated by a mathematical model, they are taken as the proof of the existence of the Epoch of Malthusian
Stagnation. This line of reasoning shows that the primary, if not the exclusive, aim of such mathematical exercises is to translate a story into a mathematical language and when the translation is done correctly, when mathematical formulae generate any kind of oscillations, large or small, significant or negligible, these formulae are taken as a proof that the myth represents reality.
The Epoch of Malthusian Stagnation is also described as the Age of Pestilence and Famine (Omran 1971 (Omran , 1983 (Omran , 1986 (Omran , 1998 .
In this stage, the major determinants of death are the Malthusian positive checks, namely epidemics, famines and wars (Omran, 1983, p. 306; Omran, 2005, p. 737) .
Even if fertility approached its biologic maximum, depopulation could and did occur as a result of epidemics, wars and famines, which repeatedly pushed mortality levels to high peaks (Omran, 2005, p. 733 We cannot present such proofs because we do not have the supporting data.
To justify the second claim we would have to have reliable records of fertility and mortality over thousands of years. We would then have to demonstrate that fertility was approaching biological limits, that such events were coinciding with high mortality peaks and that these high mortality peaks were caused by epidemics, wars and famines.
During the first stage, mortality vacillated at high levels, with infectious disease as the main cause of death plus a large proportion due to wars and famines (Robine, 2001, p. 191. Italics added.).
1. During the first stage of demographic transitions mortality vacillated at high levels 2. The main causes of death were infectious diseases 3. Large proportion of death were caused by wars and famines
We cannot prove that "mortality vacillated at high levels" because we have no relevant data for "the first stage" to carry out such a study, the stage that is assumed to have lasted for thousands of years. We cannot prove that these imagined and strongly-desired vacillations were correlated with infectious disease, wars and famines. We cannot prove that the main causes of deaths were infectious diseases. We cannot prove that a large proportion of death was due to wars and famines. We do not have records of causes of death extending over thousands of years. We do not know how the causes of death were changing over time. We do not have the records to help us to distinguish between the major cause and secondary causes. We do not know whether the main cause of death was the same over thousands of years. In order to accept the concept of the Epoch of Malthusian Stagntion and all these claims have to be accepted by faith.
The first transition phase, called the 'Age of Pestilence and Famine,' is characterized by high and fluctuating mortality rates, variable life expectancy with low average life span, and periods of population growth that are not sustained (McKeown, 2009, p. 20S. Italics added.).
1. During the Age of Pestilence and Famine (Epoch of Malthusian Stagnation) mortality rates were high and fluctuating 2. Average life span was low 3. There were periods when the population growth was not sustained Mortality rates might have been high and fluctuating but we have no data extending over thousands of years to prove it. Furthermore, we would yet have to show that these hypothetical high and fluctuating mortality rates could have been responsible for creating stagnation. The same applies to the low average life span. As for the "periods of population growth that are not sustained" we can easily demonstrate using the population data that this claim is not sustained.
The positive forces of growth had existed all along. However, they had been counterbalanced by the negative forces of malnutrition and disease (Komlos & Baten, 2003, p. 19) .
We have no reliable empirical evidence to support this claim, no study of positive and negative forces, no study of their balancing, and no study of their influence on the growth of human population. There is also no attempt to consult the population data (Maddison, 2010; Manning, 2008; US Census Bureau, 2013) to test the concept of the balancing of positive and negative forces. Here again, and quite typically, an attractive declaration fitting the generally accepted concept is made without trying to support it by solid scientific evidence.
Summary and conclusions
We have given a few examples of unsubstantiated claims associated with the concept of the Epoch of Malthusian Stagnation, examples of confident declarations, which have to be accepted by faith. They represent only a part of a wider range of misconceptions about the growth of human population and about the related issue of the economic progress as expressed in terms of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) or the GDP per capita.
It is impossible to correct the mistakes of the past 200 years in just one short article but we have mentioned a few ways of testing and correcting the prevailing misconceptions. In the next few articles we shall focus on some of these ways.
A huge step forward can be made if we identify and abandon incorrect concepts no matter how popular and how attractive they might appear to be. However, each impartial and unbiased examination of empirical evidence can also take us a step closer to a better and correct understanding of the human population dynamics and of the economic progress.
